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Abstract – Generally, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) work using two methods
of identification of attacks: by signatures, that are specific defined elements of
the network traffic possible to identify and by anomalies being some deviation
form of the network behaviour assumed as normal. Recently, some attempts have
been made to implement artificial intelligence method for detection of attacks.
Many such implementations use for testing and learning process the data set
provided by KDD (Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Competition) project
in 1999. Unfortunately, KDD99 data set was created more than eight years ago
and during this time many new attacks have been discovered. In this paper we
present our research on updating KDD99 data with traces of attacks of new types.
After updating, the data set was used for training and testing MLP (Multi Layer
Perceptron) neural network architecture IDS.
1 Introduction
Because of their generalization feature, neural networks are able to work with
imprecise and incomplete data. It means that they can recognize also patterns not
presented during a learning stage. That is why neural networks could be a good
solution for detection of a well known attack, which has been modified by an aggressor
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in order to pass through the firewall system. In that case, traditional Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), based on signatures of attacks or expert rules, may not be
able to detect the new version of this attack.
Moreover, IDS based on the artificial intelligence system does not require building a
complicated set of signatures for each attack type or profiles of user’s normal behaviour
because they are created during the learning stage automatically.
We use the KDD 99 data set as the input vectors for training and validation of the
tested neural network. In order to update this data set we used Metasploit framework
which allows to simulate a new attack type. In this paper we focus on the attacks
which cause buffer overflow in the servers providing the network services like: ftp,
http, telnet, tftp and smtp, and in the case of success allow an aggressor to execute
payload code on the victim’s host.
The result of simulation is the information about the attack detection accuracy,
represented as a number of false alarms and not detected attacks in comparison to the
number of validation vectors for each type of used neural network.
2 Neural network: a way of work
An artificial neural network is a system simulating work of the neurons in the human
brain. Fig. 1 presents the diagram of neuron’s operation.
The neuron consists of some inputs emulating dendrites of the biological neuron,
a summation module, an activation function and one output emulating an axon of
the biological neuron. The importance of a particular input can be intensified by
the weights that simulate biological neuron’s synapses. Then, the input signals are
multiplied by the values of weights and next the results are added in the summation
block. The sum is sent to the activation block where it is processed by the activation
function. Thus, we obtain neuron’s answer to the input signals “x”.
2.1 MLP (Multi Layer Perceptron)
One neuron cannot solve a complex problem that is why the neural network composed
of many neurons is used. One of the most often used architecture is the Multi Layer
Perceptron. In such a network, all neurons’ outputs of the previous layer are connected
with the neurons’ inputs of the next layer. The MLP architecture consists of one or
more hidden layers. A signal is transmitted in the one direction from the input to the
output and therefore this architecture is called feed-forward. The MLP networks are
learned using the Backward Propagation algorithm (BP). For the simulation procedure
in our research, the Matlab toolbox was used.
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3 KDD99 Input data
KDD99 data set was created based on the DARPA (Defence Advanced Research
Project Agency) intrusion detection evaluation program. MIT Lincoln Lab that
participates in this program has set up simulation of typical LAN network in order
to acquire raw TCP dump data [1]. They simulated LAN operated as a normal
environment, which was infected by various types of attacks. The raw data set was
processed into connection records.
Fig. 1. A scheme of an artificial neuron.
For each connection, 41 various features were extracted. Each connection was labelled
as normal or under a specific type of attack. Four main categories of attacks were
simulated:
• DoS (Denial of Service): an attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from
using a service e.g. TCP SYN Flood, Smurf .
• Probe: an attacker tries to find information about the target host. For
example: scanning victims in order to get knowledge about available services,
using Operating System etc.
• U2R (User to Root): an attacker has local account on victim’s host and tries
to gain the root privileges.
• R2L (Remote to Local): an attacker does not have local account on the
victim’s host and tries to obtain it.
The KDD data sets are divided into three subsets: 10%KDD, corrected KDD, whole
KDD. Basic characteristics of KDD data sets are shown in Table 1. It includes a
number of connections assigned to the particular class (DoS, Probe etc.).
Table 1. KDD99 data subsets.
Dataset DoS Probe U2r U2l Normal
10%KDD 391458 4107 52 1126 97277
Corrected KDD 229853 4166 70 16347 60593
Whole KDD 3883370 41102 52 1126 972780
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3.1 10%KDD
The 10%KDD data set is used for the training process of the IDS. It includes the
connections simulating the following 22 types of the attacks: back, buffer_overflow,
ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, ipsweep, land, loadmodule, multihop, neptune, nmap,
normal, perl, phf, pod, portsweep, rootkit, satan, smurf, spy, teardrop. The attacks
are not represented by the same number of connections. The most of the simulated
attacks are of DoS group because of the nature of this type of attacks that use many
IP packets in order to block network services.
3.2 Corrected KDD
The Corrected KDD data set is used for the testing process of IDS. It includes
additional 14 types of new attacks not presented in 10%KDD and whole KDD. Owing
to them, it is possible to check if the tested IDS is able to detect a new attack not
presented in the training phase.
In our research only 10% of KDD and corrected KDD data set were used.
4 Preprocessing of new attcks to input vectors
4.1 Simulating a new attack with Metasploit
For simulation of a new attack we used the tool provided by the Metasploit project.
The Metasploit Framework is a development platform for creating security tools and
exploits. It could be used by network security professionals to perform penetration
tests and development of IDS signatures. The framework was created in 2003 using
the Perl scripting language and later was rewritten in the Ruby programming language.
In our simulation we used the Metasploit framework in version 3.2. It consists about
300 types of exploits that can be used against the network services working on OS like
Windows, Linux, Unix, MAC. In the case when the exploit succeeds, the payload is
executed on the victim and the user could be provided with a shell to interact with the
payload. More information about the Metasploit project could be found in [9].
For our research we decided to choose the following exploits:
• Learning data set: linksys_apply_cgi, tftp32longfilename, goodtech_telnet,
filecopa_list_overflow, wsftp_server_503_mkd, warftpd_165_pass,
warftpd_165_user, mailcarrier_smtp.
• Testing data set: tftpdwin.long_filename, goodtech_telnet,
cesarftp_mkd, slimftpd_list_concat, easyfilesharing_pass, freeftpd_user,
netterm_netftpd_user, mailcarrier_smtp, atftp.long_filename,
linksys_apply_cgi .
The common feature for all chosen attacks is that they cause buffer overflow by
sending a very long string to the target as password, login or arguments of commands
used by the network services like ftp, telnet, smtp, telnet etc.
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4.2 Attacks preprocessing
During simulation of an attack we collected traces in the tcpdump format with the
network sniffer (ethereal). Besides the traces consisting of attack we also simulated
and collected normal traffic sent to the same service as used by attack. Owing to them
later we could check level of false alarms generated by the tested IDS when we provided
as an input data normal traffic with many features similar to those used in the attack
traffic. In KDD 99 there are also normal traces but sometimes there is a lack of traffic
similar to the attack that we decided to use for updating. For example, there is only
one connection for tftp traffic in the “corrected” data set, also normal traffic with the
flag RSTO is not represented for the service like smtp or ftp.
After that “bro” tool [10] was used to process the data into the connection record in
the same way as it was done for the KDD 99 project.
4.3 Proposal of adding a new feature
An attack could be detected properly using existing features. It was confirmed also
in the first simulations. Many representations of an attack (not all) against the services
like ftp, telnet were detected correctly. Unfortunately, the attacks aimed at tftp and
smtp services were not detected at all. When we compare the connection records
related to each attack type with normal traffic we notice that the attacks related to
ftp or telnet connection may be detected based on asymmetry between the destination
and source bytes sent features. For normal traffic in the services like telnet or ftp
(only for 21 TCP port transmission) usually more data are sent from the destination
to the source during one connection. In the case of attack types that we plan to add
more data in the connection record is sent from the source to the destination. This
observation is not correct for the services like tftp and smtp where also during normal
connection more data could be sent from the source to the destination. Moreover, we
noticed that asymmetry between the source and the destination bytes is not enough to
detect all attacks related to ftp, http or telnet connection. For the reasons mentioned
above we decided to add a new feature to the KDD99 data set. This feature represents
the longest string sent during connection as password, login or arguments of commands
like list, mcd, snmp hello.
5 Training process
5.1 Process of Selection of the Input Vector
The 10% KDD data set includes a large number of connections, which affects time
duration of training, high requirements for efficient implementation of neural network
and hardware to it work. Therefore the research presented in this publication for a
training purpose three randomly selected small data sets were used. Table 2 shows how
many connections are assigned to the particular training data set. Because the data
used for a training process should represent statistically all connections presented in
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the whole 10%KDD data set we decided to modify the process of random selection of
input vector for the training process in the following way:
• There was chosen the same number of connections representing each type of
attack. In the case when the number of connections for a particular type of
attack was lower than the assumed one all connections for this group were
selected.
• For normal traffic there was chosen the representation of all services presented
in 10%KDD data set. Also in the case when a number of normal connections
for a particular service was lower than the assumed one all connections for
this group were selected.
Table 2. Data subsets for the training process.
Data Set name for
training process
Number
of normal
connection
Number of
connection
labelled as
attack
Training set
description
nauIbiza2009f1 1176 879 Only existed connection
from 10%KDD
nauIbiza2009f1+new 1184 887 Vectors related to new
attack added
Nau_Ibiza2009f1+new-ext 1184 887 New feature was added
Because some features of connection (e.g., protocol, flags) existed as a character
string, they were transformed to numerical representation.
Main Assumption for the Training Process of MLP:
• Learning method: Quasi Newton BFGS and Levenberg-Marquardt
• Number of Epochs: 1000.
• MSE (Mean Square error): 0.01.
• Learning rate: 0,9.
• Activation function: log-signoid.
• Number of neurons in the hidden layer: 8.
• Number of neurons in the output layer: 1.
• Update of weights – batch mode (after presentation of the entire training data
set).
6 Results of the test
The neural network architectures were tested using the whole data set from the
“Corrected KDD” updated with a new connection that represents simulated new attacks
and normal traffic. The data sets used for the testing stage were shown in Table 3.
For the analysis of neural network reply, it was assumed that the value from 0 to 0.5
refers to “normal” and from 0.5 to 1 “attack”.
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 21:54:11
UM
CS
Przemysław Kukiełka, Zbigniew Kotulski 57
Table 3. Data subset for the testing stage.
Data Set name
for testing
process
Number of
normal
connections
Number of
connections labelled
as an attack
Test set desc
Test+new 60604 250445 New attack and
normal added
Test_new-ext 60604 250445 New feature was
added
Our research was divided into three stages. In the first we built MLP neural network
IDS and checked its ability to classify of connections already presented in the KDD99
data set and new added connection. The training stage is performed before the KDD99
connection is accomplished. In the second we added to the 10%KDD data set new
attack simulated with the usage of Metasploit framework and similar to added attacks
normal traffic. In comparison to the first stage here new attacks and new normal traffic
were used in both training and testing processes. In the third stage we extended with
a new feature training and test data sets from the second stage. The first one could
be used to compare the results with second and third in order to observe influence
of adding new input vector and features on classification of existing representation of
attacks and normal traffic.
As correct detection we mean that IDS correctly recognizes attack and also “normal”
traffic with many features similar to the detected attack type. We noticed, for instance,
that neural network classified an attack based only on the flag feature. It is incorrect
behaviour because normal connection could be also finished with the flags RST0 or
RSTR not only SF as it exists in 10%KDD data set. Therefore we decided to add new
normal traffic input vectors. The results of tests for all phases are presented in Table
4. All new attacks were detected only in the third stage when we added a new feature.
Table 4. Results of three tests phases.
Test set/training
set
False alarm
Number/Percent
of false normal
connections
Not detected/
Detection rate
Not detected
new attack/false
new normal
Test+new/nauRST 1746 2,9% 22697 90,9% atak_nettermftp_user,
atak_slimftp_list,
smtp_multicarier,
goodtech_telnet
tftp_prosysyst
/telnet,ftp,http
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Table 4. Continued.
Test+new/
nauIbiza2009f1
+new
1506 2,5% 21752 91,3% atak_nettermftp_user,
atak_slimftp_list,
smtp_multicarier„
goodtech_telnet
tftp_prosysyst
/telnet,ftp,http
Test+new-ext/
NAU_IBIZA2009F1
+NEW-EXT
3089 5,1% 29815 88% All new attacks
detected /telnet, ftp
7 Conclusions
Usage of neural networks for intrusion detection with the input data from the DARPA
project was presented in many papers. Unfortunately, since 1999 when KDD 99 was
published many new attacks have been launched. Therefore for more credible tests
of IDS it is important to update the KDD 99 data set. The goal of this research
was to find the way of adding new connection records represented of new attacks and
check how it influences on classification of already presented network traffic. The main
conclusions are:
• Selection of the input data is a very important issue. Representation of all
types of attacks and normal activity should be included in the learning data
set. Therefore besides new attack connections, representation of normal traffic
not presented before in KDD99 was added.
• In order to properly evaluate ability of detection of new attack also to testing
set “normal” traffic similar to attack that we would like to detect should be
added. When both attack and normal connections were properly classified
we can say that a new attack will be properly detected.
• A new attack could be detected based on existing KDD 99 features but for
the others a new feature should be created
• Adding a new feature makes some influence on the classification process. The
reason can be that for longer input a vector is more difficult for training
and testing process of neural network. Probably there should be used more
complex architecture of neural network but it is the issue for future research.
• In our experiment all attacks were properly detected only when we added
a new feature. Concerning a false alarm rate for that case only two new
added “normal” connections are not properly classified. For the first and
second stages of research a false alarm rate for a new added connection was
significantly worse.
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